Acquisition Programs/Total Information Awareness—Aldridge Briefs Media

On Feb. 7, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) Edward C. "Pete" Aldridge Jr., held a Pentagon briefing followed by Q&A on Acquisition Programs and the Total Information Awareness (TIA) program. Also participating was Michael Wynne, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics).

RAH-66 Comanche aircraft.
Photo courtesy The Boeing Company

I have a few opening comments this afternoon, and then we'll open it up for any questions you may have. I will first address some actions we've taken to modify our operation of the Total Information Awareness [TIA] project being undertaken by DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency].

Total Information Awareness

As you know, TIA is a project to demonstrate information technologies that can be used as tools to prevent future terrorist acts anywhere in the world. There have been some concerns expressed regarding the protection of the privacy of individuals, and to address those concerns, we're establishing two oversight functions.

Internal TIA Oversight Board

The first is an internal TIA oversight board, which I will chair. This board will establish policies and procedures for the use within the Department of Defense of those technologies and will establish the protocols for transferring those technologies to entities outside of the Department of Defense. Other than myself, the internal board will consist of the Under Secretaries of Policy and Personnel and Readiness; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs; the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs; the General Counsel; and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight. The first meeting of this board will be held at the end of this month.

External TIA Federal Advisory Committee

We're also establishing an external federal advisory committee that would advise the Secretary of Defense on the range of policy and legal issues that are raised by the development and potential applications of TIA technologies. The charter of this committee and [a list of] its members are included in a statement that I believe was released just earlier today [p. 10], which will give you the names and what the purpose of that external board will be.

Acquisition Programs

I would now like to turn to management and improvement issues and to some of the weapon systems decisions that we've made as part of the president's FY '04 budget request. Dov Zakheim briefly covered some of these at his budget briefing on Monday, but I'll give you the opportunity to ask questions if you need more detail.

DoD 5000 Series

The DoD 5000 series, the documentation that establishes the DoD weapons acquisition system, is ready for the Deputy Secretary of Defense's signature. We expect that momentarily. The DoD 5000.1 directive is now three pages, with a five-page attachment. DoD 5000.1 tells us what we want to accomplish with our acquisition system: flexibility, responsiveness, innovation, discipline, and streamlined and effective management.

The DoD 5000.2 instruction is now 12 pages, with a 24-page attachment, telling us the management framework and the elements that must be incorporated in our acquisition plans, such as evolutionary development, milestone decision points, technology plans, and criteria for entering the various stages of the programs. Those are some of the things that they cover.

***Aldridge** is the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.*

You can actually read this document and know what to do. The old documentation—the directive, instruction, and regulation—was a total of 250 pages, and I will assert was never read. Hopefully, this one will be.

Spiral Development/ Program Stability

In accordance with my goals, most of our major weapon systems now have an acquisition strategy that includes evolutionary spiral development, and to the best of our knowledge, are properly priced to meet the schedule and performance objectives. We have budgeted these programs, for the most part, based upon independent cost estimates that tend to be more accurate than those provided by the military departments. I believe these two elements—spiral development and properly pricing programs—are essential if we are to deliver the weapon systems to the warfighter on schedule and within the performance that we have promised.

Image courtesy Northrop Grumman
DD(X) artist's rendition

Future Combat System

Regarding major acquisition activities, we've added funding—about $1.3 billion—for the Army's Future Combat System. The Army has made a conscious decision to defer modernization of some of its legacy equipment in favor of investing in the future of the Army. A major decision is planned for May of 2003 to enter into system development and demonstration Milestone B. We're having monthly reviews with the Army as we lead up to this decision point.

Comanche

We've restructured the Comanche program. It's now reconfigured for reconnaissance and light attack, and we've reduced the numbers to about 650—that's roughly half—pending the outcome of the review of the Future Combat System of the Army. The program was having some difficulty in achieving its performance objectives for the full attack capability, and we decided to limit its capabilities for now.

Missile Defense

The president has directed we provide a limited capability for defense against long-range ballistic missiles by upgrading the missile defense test bed with interceptors, a sea-based component, improved land-based radars, and a plan to evolve this capability through evolutionary spiral development in the future.

The first missile defense component ready for deployment—the PAC-3 —is being transferred to the Army in accordance with our management plan for missile defense. You may recall that our management plan calls for the military department to assume the deployment operations after the capability has been developed by the Missile Defense Agency.

Shipbuilding

We've increased the shipbuilding rate from five ships to seven in FY '04, and plan to gradually increase this rate through the FYDP [Future Years Defense Plan] period. We're continuing with the conversion of the four Trident submarines to very capable, conventionally weapon-armed SSGNs [Nuclear Powered Cruise Missile Submarines].

The DDX (destroyer) program continues with its focus toward technologies applicable to a family of ships—cruisers, destroyers, and littoral combat ships—consistent with last year's restructuring.

The DoD 5000 series...is ready for the Deputy Secretary of Defense's signature. We expect that momentarily... it's prescribing what we want you [program managers] to do, but not the recipe of how to do it.

The CVNX (aircraft carrier, nuclear, experimental) program has been restructured to place as much technology as possible on the lead ship, now called the CVN-21. New propulsion plant, electric catapult, reduced manning, improved survivability, and more efficient flight operations are the keys to this new carrier, planned to be available in the 2011 period. And plans for a second ship to begin construction in 2011 will further enhance carrier effectiveness.

F/A-22

We've had some delays in the flight test program that have resulted in a trans-

Joint Strike Fighter
Photo courtesy Lockheed Martin

fer of some funding from procurement to R&D [Research & Development]. Recent results have shown that the flight-test program is recovering, but we've had to slow the production somewhat in the near term. This has not increased the cost of the program since we have a "buy to budget" plan for the F-22.

F/A-18

We're continuing production of the F/A-18E/F at a rate of 42 per year. We will introduce the production of the F/A-18G, which is the electronic warfare version, in FY '06, and the combination of the Es, the Fs, and the Gs will total 42 aircraft a year throughout the FYDP period.

V-22 Osprey

The flight test program for the V-22 is going well, with over 250 hours of testing since its return to flight. They're doing high rate of descent and shipboard compatibility testing now—the more difficult and challenging testing period. I will travel to Patuxent River next week to review the results and the future plans for the flight test program.

Joint Strike Fighter

The Joint Strike Fighter development is progressing well. There will be a major engine test this year, and we're a little over 2-1/2 years away from first flight of the development aircraft. Our eight international partners are heavily involved in the development, and their local companies are winning contracts for various components. As you know, the United Kingdom picked the STOVL [Short Takeoff from Vertical Landing] version of the Joint Strike Fighter, as the aircraft that will go on their new carrier, the winner of which we just announced last week.

We're finalizing agreements with Israel and Singapore for potential purchase of the JSF through a security cooperation and participation arrangement. This is much like a Foreign Military Sales activity.

We've accepted the results of the Navy-Marine Corps Tactical Air Integration Study. Better integration of the elements of the Navy and Marine Corps missions and the integration of a more reliable, available, and improved capability Joint Strike Fighter have permitted the Navy and the Marine Corps to reduce the number of aircraft required to accomplish their mission. There should be no effect of this decision in the near term, and we expect international sales to more than offset the reduction in the Navy's Joint Strike Fighter numbers.

Other Transformational Programs

Other transformational programs are continuing. The Transformational Communication System, TCS, which is the equivalent of putting fiber optics in space; the acceleration of the UAVs [Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) and UCAVs, [Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles]; and a serious start on a spaced-based radar are in the budget. We've accelerated our efforts on hypersonic technology and have allocated about $1.3 billion in our science and technology budget for high-speed hypersonics and space technology.

2004 Budget Request

Let me close by commenting briefly and in general on the president's budget requests. We've done a lot of good things in this budget to address deficiencies and problems. We've balanced our needs for our people, our readiness, our modernization, and transformation; we've balanced the near-term risk versus the far-term risk; and we feel comfortable that this balance is right.

However, there are some things we did not do. We would have liked to eliminate sub-standard family housing units faster; we would have liked to have recapitalized our infrastructure at a faster rate; we would have liked to have bought more tactical aircraft at a faster pace to reduce the average age of our tactical Air Force; we would have liked to have gotten our shipbuilding rate up to 10 ships a year versus 7 to sustain the size of the Navy; and we would have liked to have gotten our science and technology budget up to our goal of 3 percent versus the 2.7 percent that's in there now. Again, balance is the key, and we believe overall, it's about right.

Q

Mind if I ask you a couple of questions about the Comanche program? You mentioned that the numbers were halved, and you attribute that, it seems, largely to the fact that the role is limited to recon and light attack. But I'm hoping you can elaborate upon this. My understanding is that before the DAB [Defense Acquisition Board] in the fall, the program really was in serious jeopardy. And

there was a lot of analysis, there was a lot of reworking, restructuring the program that was done, basically, as I understand, that gave you and your staff a comfort level with the program. Can you elaborate upon what sort of restructuring, what sort of analysis gave you a comfort level? And why these numbers, as opposed to the 1,200?

A

The original Comanche program was over 1,200 aircraft, including variants that included light attack plus attack versions. And as we looked at the weight required to hang more and more capability on the Comanche, it was very clear that the risk was extremely high as we got further and further into heavier and heavier requirements. And that was causing the program to slip; it was causing them to spend a lot of money on capabilities that we weren't sure we really needed.

So we looked at that program to try to reduce the risk. There was an independent look done by IDA [Institute for Defense Analyses], General Larry Welch, who felt that there was too much risk in these high-end requirements. And we decided to slow down the program—focus it on what we could achieve with high confidence, which was the light attack plus reconnaissance—and then look at the structure of what the Army needed for their Future Combat System [FCS]. All of these are related decisions.

The decision coming up in May on the Army's FCS is really going to be a major decision relative to the future composition and size and components of the Army. We felt that [by looking at] the Comanche program, with its 650 aircraft, and the FCS, then we can make a decision on how all those fit together at that particular time. But risk was the key thing behind it.

Q

Can I just follow up on that? One thing in particular, the UAV component of it—you know, a lot of people wonder why can't the armed recon mission be done by a UAV?. And there's a big push at the DoD level in the Army to pursue the UAV. There was some analysis done, as I understand it, that basically addressed that question. Can you talk about that?

A

Well, that was one of the other factors that went into the question of what is the size of the Comanche we should be planning for now. Given [the fact that] we don't know how all that fits together, we can define a structure of the Army that could use roughly 650 Comanches, and then let these other issues—Future Combat System, the role of UAVs—play out before we made a final decision as to the direction of the Army.

A

Yes.

Q

Can you say a word or two about the Boeing tanker lease proposal and how far along you are? You've had a series of meetings. It looks like you're getting close to a decision.

A

It's hard. You're right, we have had a series of meetings within the [Pentagon]. We've had Boeing in to talk to them some more. It is a major investment required by the Department of Defense.

WE'VE DONE A LOT OF GOOD THINGS IN THIS [2004] BUDGET TO ADDRESS DEFICIENCIES AND PROBLEMS. WE'VE BALANCED OUR NEEDS FOR OUR PEOPLE, OUR READINESS, OUR MODERNIZATION, AND TRANSFORMATION; WE'VE BALANCED THE NEAR-TERM RISK VERSUS THE FAR-TERM RISK; AND WE FEEL COMFORTABLE THAT THIS BALANCE IS RIGHT.

Q

The Senate passed an amendment [Wyden-Feinstein Amendment, Jan. 23, 2003] designed to severely curb both research and deployment of the Total Information Awareness system. Do you think that the advisory committees, which you have announced today, should lead the conference committee to drop that amendment? Or what do you think about it?

A

We're working with the Congress on their amendment. We've actually briefed Senator Wyden on that concept, and we think we can probably come to a compromise that is acceptable to all.

Q

But do you think these elements address some of their concerns?

It's something new—anything new leads people to ask questions about whether or not it's doable. But we are working it now. In fact, we're having meetings this week, and we'll try to wrap up some direction, hopefully next week, on this whole idea.

We're looking at the military value; we're looking at how we do a lease that would protect the taxpayers' interest; what are the other alternatives, lease versus buy? Those kind of things are all being assessed at this point. No decision has been made as of yet, but we're trying to work those out and come to a decision soon.

Q

I just want to follow up on that. You say that you're going to come to a decision soon;

you want to try to make a decision next week. Did I understand that correctly?

A

We would like to. Whether or not we can depends on whether people can focus their attention on those things.

Q

Can you talk about the funding for that program and how that is reflected in the budget that you sent up to the Hill?

A

There's no funding at this point in the budget that's gone before the Hill. The Air Force had a plan to purchase the aircraft in their Program Objective Memorandum. That is reflected in the out years. But as of right now, there is no funding identified in the FY '04 budget. If we decided to proceed, we would have to go in with a reprogramming request and work with the congressional committees to find the funds.

Q

Did DoD actively solicit participation from the privacy groups to be members of the external oversight board, specifically those groups that had expressed serious reservations about the concept of TIA?

A

No. What we've done is form the external group we have—which has the expertise to go look into these issues. How they proceed and how they may hold their hearings—and maybe they would solicit the groups to come and give them their view—that would be something that would be worked out by the external oversight board.

Q

The UAV/UCAV road map—isn't the latest version of that about due now?

A

I saw it as of yesterday—the draft version.

Q

Can you talk about it? How might it affect what you do and how much money may be involved?

A

As you know, we've put a lot of money for UAVs and UCAVs into our budget, both in Predators and Global Hawks. We are working on a joint program between the Navy and the Air Force for a follow-on UCAV.

All those are still a little bit in the out years. The road map really does lay out what we want to accomplish, shows the programs that we have currently underway, and tries to rationalize a way ahead that avoids duplication. It is really good, but it still needs some coordination work to be done.

Q

So Northrop Grumman hasn't captured the Navy UCAV with X-47—are you going to reopen the competition in that?

A

We are examining what a joint program might look like and what the competition element of that joint program should be.

Q

So you may compete the X-45, X-47?

A

We are still working that. We haven't made the final decision on it yet. But we will have a joint program.

Q

Do you have any other details on the UCAV Joint Program Office?

A

No. It's being discussed now, and we haven't [decided] who's going to lead it—I would speculate and project it will be run much like we're running the Joint Strike Fighter Program Office, where there is a lead Service program manager, and the other Services have the acquisition, and then those Services switch.

Wynne: We had a session on that very thing. And what we want to do, I think, is let DARPA combine the programs, because they're both DARPA programs, and then move toward a first flight or some objective event before we begin to assign it to an Executive Agent or Service. The Joint Strike Fighter—what used to be called the JAST (Joint Advanced Strike Technology), and even a [different] name before that—started out as a DARPA program. And so it is very much similar to that. But we're going to let it mature under the DARPA umbrella, even if it has inter-Service program managers.

Q

Yes, sir. Secretary Rumsfeld told the House Armed Services Committee the other day that if the V-22 [Osprey] doesn't perform satisfactorily during its flight test, it could be cancelled. What's your own assessment of how that program's working? Are you still as skeptical as you've always been?

A

I'm always skeptical until I'm proven otherwise. Their flight test program is laid out very well. They are not skimping on doing hard tests early. They're

WE'VE ADDED FUNDING—ABOUT $1.3 BILLION—FOR THE ARMY'S FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEM. THE ARMY HAS MADE A CONSCIOUS DECISION TO DEFER MODERNIZATION OF SOME OF ITS LEGACY EQUIPMENT IN FAVOR OF INVESTING IN THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY.

testing in that high rate of descent, where the vortex ring state problems exist. They're doing shipboard compatibility testing right now, [which is] another problem where you get different flow fields across the ships and integration with other helicopters. They're working on that.

My trip next week is to go down and assess where they are, how well they have done, what's the plan for the future, and what the reliability looks like in the airplane so far, because they've done a lot of work on that. So my trip next week should give me a little better indication of how they are progressing. I haven't heard any real problems yet, but we'll see after my trip.

Q

Can you talk about the downsizing plans that you have for the AT&L office? And are you transferring functions to the Services, for example?

A

As you may recall, I had a re-engineering plan for AT&L, which includes a reduction in staff by about 15 percent. We're on track to make that happen. Also we're trying to move some elements of AT&L from the management of certain projects back to the Services. I had a listing of those—about $700 million worth of activities that were joint programs that could be given to the Services for management.

Congress, in their authorization and appropriations bill, has instructed me not to do that.

Q

So you're not transferring that [$700 million worth of activities]?

A

They have told us that they do not want us to do it, even though they did this before I even asked. It was going to be part of the FY '04 budget. We're going to continue to address that and work with the Congress.

Q

Why are they opposed?

Petty Officer 3rd Class Jerry Lowe, a Navy aviation boatswain's mate, directs an MV-22 Osprey landing on the flight deck of the *USS Essex* (LHD 2). The Osprey, with its unique tilt rotor design, is again undergoing operational testing designed to evaluate the operational effectiveness and stability of the Osprey for service with the Marine Corps and Air Force. DoD Photo by Navy Petty Officer 3rd Class Jason A. Pylarinos

A

They're concerned that if these joint programs—many of which they provided—moved to a military department, they will be raided to the detriment of the Department and other Services to pay for Service-unique [programs]. And so the result is these [joint] programs will go away in some way or form. They're afraid of that. I think we could fix that, but that's their call.

Q

Under the '04 budget, in the projections, what's the total number of F/A-22s envisioned for the Air Force? And do you think that will ultimately be the number?

A

As I've mentioned before, we have a plan called "buy to budget." As you may recall, last year when we agreed to proceed with the F-22, there was a big debate between the Air Force estimate of F-22 costs and the independent CAIG [Cost Analysis Improvement Group] estimate of about $7 billion.

We established a program by which we would use the Air Force estimate of cost, but we would only buy the number of airplanes the CAIG says you could buy at that cost, and that was the "buy to budget." That number was roughly 295, but it permitted the Air Force, if they could in fact achieve cost savings, to buy more, up to the 339 that they would have liked to have had. As this flight test program has proceeded, and the cost of the flight test activities have gone up, we have deliberately moved money from the procurement account to R&D to pay for that. Therefore, the number of aircraft has to drop.

So the number now projected at the estimate of the procurement cost is about 276. But the incentive is still there for the Air Force, as they go out into the future, to invest in cost-savings measures, and we will permit them to buy more aircraft within those cost limitations, if they can do that. But right now, it's around 276, which is affordable—and again, I'm projecting out to the year 2010 now, which is not easy to do, but that's roughly the number.

Q

Assuming the V-22 [Osprey] is able to pass its flight test program, when would the program be returned to a full production status? And is [full production] budgeted for in the out years?

A

There is an increase in the procurement account for the V-22 in the out years, under the assumption that the flight test program is successful. We will have to make the decision on whether or not to continue that production profile probably this summer through the fall, for the FY '05 budget submission that will go next year. So I am very much on top of the flight test program to make sure that so long as it's proceeding in a successful direction, we will continue to do that. If we start seeing some problems occur, we may have to readdress where we go.

Q

Sir, a study called the ISAT 2002 [Information, Science and Technology] study, "Security With Privacy," said, among other things, that DARPA currently has a number of programs in its, quote, "information offices"—meaning Information Processing Technology Office, Information Awareness Office, and Information Exploitation Office—which involve the potential use of information derived from distributed systems, government, and private databases. Aside from the TIA project, which has been widely discussed, what other projects in those three information-related offices raise these type of privacy concerns?

A

I don't think any of them do. A lot of the information technology deals with protection of information from outsiders and computer protection for increasing the bandwidth available to communicate, which has always been a restriction. There's lots of these information technology activities. I am only aware of the one TIA activity that has raised concerns regarding privacy, but TIA is the only program of its kind that I'm aware of.

Q

The Joint Staff has discussed naming an executive agent for the Blue Force Tracking program. [The Blue Force Tracking Program will provide both friendly force tracking and communications and situational awareness to the dismounted soldier or platform.] Is this something that's on your radar screen yet? And what would you think about it? And how would the Services get the money? Because my understanding is that the '04 budget doesn't account for that.

A

I'm not familiar with the Joint Staff proposal. I am quite familiar with Blue Force Tracking. I think it's an excellent idea. We don't have enough of it. It has a lot of implications for our ability to have a more effective force and certainly to avoid collateral effects.

Q

Is interoperability a current problem—what are each of the individual Services doing?

A

Absolutely. And I think that's why the Joint Staff is proposing a joint office where we can solve those kind of problems.

Q

The Navy is estimating the cost of CVN-21, the first ship, at $11.7 billion, including Research and Development. Has that number been reviewed by the CAIG? Is that a CAIG number? And are you comfortable that that ship is going to deliver more than two times the value of a Nimitz *class carrier?*

A

I haven't seen the numbers. I don't know what fiscal year dollars that [estimate] is for—if it's in year 2018 dollars, it makes a big difference versus the dollars today. I have not seen it. We are going through the process now.

The CVN-21 will come to a DAB for review, and the CAIG, as far as I know, has not reviewed those cost estimates. In fact, we're not even sure exactly all the details of what's going to be in the carrier—the first unit carrier versus the second.

We are very much involved with spiral development of carriers, as well. We don't want to overload the first carrier such that we increase the risk so much that we have to increase its cost even more so. So, the capabilities of what I've seen look very attractive, including not only reducing the manpower, which saved us some money, but also the survivability and effectiveness.

Q

If I might follow up on that question about the ISAT 2002 study, I think this is a study by the DARPA and it does say a number of programs raise these concerns about private databases. Would you have any objection if I were to talk to the heads of these three offices just to sort of go through this? Because I know there's a lot of issues here.

A

I think I would talk to Tony Tether [Director, DARPA] first. I don't object, but Tony Tether—he's the one who puts this all together. I'm not familiar with the study, so I can't comment on the validity of what the study is or is not.

Q

On TIA, is [retired] Admiral [John] Poindexter still a part of TIA?

A

Yes.

Q

And do the reforms you mention mean a reduction in size and scope of what TIA could do?

A

No. What we're talking about is to give myself and the Department of Defense one more degree of confidence that we're doing the right thing with the project. And there are protocols, that if the project technology is successful—a fact yet to be proven—and an agency outside the Department of Defense wants to use it, we've got the right protocols to transfer that [technology]—with all the necessary provisions of privacy, supplemented by the external board, which will also review this—to give us additional confidence that we're doing the right thing.

Q

If Congress gives you the go-ahead, when do you plan to have TIA operational?

A

I don't know when it will be operational. It's a technology project. The FY '04 budget has $20 million for the TIA project, and I believe in FY '03 we had 10 million. If things proceed in Congress, we'll

be spending the money and determining the feasibility. That has yet to be determined—it's still a technology project.

Q

We face a possible war with Iraq. Now can you talk about some of the resident technologies that are in the field today, that might have some impact on the tactics, techniques, and procedures the U.S. would use to fight a fast and furious war, as the president said? What's out there today?

Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
DoD Photo

A

Well, I think what you're asking is, what do we have that is transformational today, as opposed to transformational into the future. The transformational communications system, space-based radar—those are transformational for the future. I would say what's transformational today is how we're using the equipment we've got.

Clearly, the Special Forces guy on horseback calling in a B-52 with precision-guided munitions is a transformational way of using forces we currently have. Stealth was transformational before. It's [still around]—we're [still] using it. Bandwidth is increasing the communications system. The integration of these things together, through the COAC [Combined Air Operations Center] that's [located] in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and Prince Sultan Air Base—those are transformational.

So the things that we see in the field, like precision munitions, UAVs, stealth technology, long-range strike aircraft, B-52s, even though not transformational, are certainly being used in transformational ways.

The integration of all this stuff—to be able to pull a lot of different systems and lots of information together and go after a target using not only satellites, but JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System] and AWACS [Airborne Warning ad Control System], P-3s and AC-130 gunships, and Predators—all of that information being consolidated, and then watching the young kids on the chat box in their computers talking—that's transformational.

Q

One of the worst problems in the Gulf War was fratricide. And that's the neutral way of saying killing your own forces accidentally. What progress has been made since the Gulf War on that issue, in the technologies or procedures? There was a BCIS [Battlefield Combat Identification System] that was cancelled a couple years ago that was supposed to solve all that. You indicated some concern about interoperability problems.

A

Well, I'm afraid we haven't solved all of it. We saw the problems with some unfortunate deaths of Canadian soldiers quite recently. And we need to work on it. We are making progress. I'm not sure I can tell you exactly how far we've gone, but we do have some Blue Force Tracking capabilities. We'd like to get more of it. I think combat ID and combat identification is a very good thing for us to do. Progress is slow—we need to make more progress, I would say.

Q

Can you talk a little bit about changes to the B-1? It was built to penetrate, and that seems to not be the case anymore. What does that mean for the bomber fleet?

A

Well, as you know, we had roughly 97 B-1s. We took 33 of them out and used the money to modernize the other ones that were remaining. So we've put improved equipment on them. And as the B-1 ages and our precision weapons systems get developed, we try to adapt the airplane, which has basically now become a truck, to deliver the munition. It's not the airplane that's important—it's delivering the munition on the target that's important. And the B-1 is quite capable of doing that, but we need to make sure we continue to improve its defensive capabilities against more aggressive threats and to give it survivability by giving it a longer-range munition and things like that.

Q

I'm just wondering if you could tell me whether [retired] Admiral [John] Poindexter will remain in charge of the Total Information Awareness project for the indefinite future; and if so, will his role change in some way by having a board overseeing his activities? And I also wondered if the outside board will have any binding nature to its recommendations?

A

I don't want to get into personalities. And I really don't want to debate the merits of TIA. Let me talk about the board. The board—the internal board—certainly as I will chair it, is focused upon what we in the Department of Defense are doing to make sure that we feel comfortable with this project. It offers one more checkpoint that things are going right and that we have all the restrictions in place, and if we ever do transition that project to another agency, it's done in a proper manner.

The external board, which will be set up under the law—the Federal Advisory Committee Act [FACA]—will be run just like a federal advisory board. In accordance with that, there will be meetings which will be established and public in some cases, unless they get into classified information. There will be opportunities for people to come

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NEWS RELEASE

Total Information Awareness (TIA) Update

Washington D.C. (Feb. 7, 2003). The Department of Defense will establish two boards to provide oversight of the Total Information Awareness Project, the program designed to develop tools to track terrorists. The two boards, an internal oversight board and an outside advisory committee, will work with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), as it continues its research. These boards will help ensure that TIA develops and disseminates its products to track terrorists in a manner consistent with U.S. constitutional law, U.S. statutory law, and American values related to privacy.

The TIA internal oversight board will oversee and monitor the manner in which terrorist tracking tools are transitioned for real-world use. This board will establish policies and procedures for use within DoD of the TIA-developed tools and will establish protocols for transferring these capabilities to entities outside DoD. A primary focus of the board will be to ensure that the TIA-developed tools to track terrorists will be used only in accordance with existing privacy protection laws and policies. The board, which is expected to hold its first meeting by the end of February 2003, will be composed of senior DoD officials.

The outside advisory board will be convened as a federal advisory committee and will comply with all the legal and regulatory requirements for such bodies. The committee will advise the Secretary of Defense on the range of policy and legal issues that are raised by the development and potential application of advanced technology to help identify terrorists before they act.

Members of the outside advisory board are Newton Minow (Chairman), director of the Annenberg Washington Program and Annenberg Professor of Communications Law and Policy at Northwestern University; Floyd Abrams, renowned civil rights attorney; Zöe Baird, president Markle Foundation; Griffin Bell, former U.S. Attorney General and Court of Appeals judge; Gerhard Casper, president emeritus for Stanford University and Professor of Law; William T. Coleman, Jr., former Secretary of Transportation; and Lloyd Cutler, former White House Counsel.

DARPA is continuing its research into whether advanced technologies can be used to help identify terrorist planning activities. This technology development program was established under the name Total Information Awareness (TIA) and is designed to catch terrorists before they strike. Under the rubric of TIA, DARPA is attempting to develop three categories of tools—language translation, data search and pattern recognition, and advanced collaborative and decision support tools. The research conducted under TIA will provide the tools for obtaining information pertaining to activities of terrorists, and if connected together, this information could alert authorities before terrorists' plans are carried out. While the research to date is promising, TIA is still only a concept.

Development of these anti-terrorism tracking tools would allow the agencies to better execute their missions. TIA does not plan to create a gigantic database. Further, TIA has not ever collected or gathered and is not now collecting or gathering any intelligence information. This is and will continue to be the responsibility of the U.S. foreign intelligence/counterintelligence agencies, which operate under various legal and policy restrictions with congressional oversight. This technology development program in no way alters the authority or responsibility of the intelligence community. Furthermore, TIA has never collected, and has no plan or intent to collect privately held consumer data on U.S. citizens. It is a research program designed to catch terrorists before they strike.

Editor's Note: This information is in the public domain at **http://www.defenselink.mil/news**.

and talk to the board, to provide their advice.

It will be run just like any other advisory committee, under the chairmanship of Newt Minow, and other people who are named in the press release. All have credentials and expertise in this area. And I think that gives us one other dimension of [checks and balances]. It's external and it will be reporting to the Secretary of Defense—it's advisory to him. I'm sure there are lots of issues regarding privacy and other things that go beyond just what the TIA does; there's issues of how you handle detainees and things of that nature that this board can in fact advise the Secretary of Defense about.

Q

So he [Poindexter] is still in charge? You weren't suggesting anything other than that?

A

He is still there. No, I'm not suggesting any changes.

Q

I just wanted to follow up on the 5000-series streamlined acquisition rules. Beyond sort of incorporating or putting more of an emphasis on spiral development and properly funding [programs], is it your intention with these simpler DoD 5000-series rules to make it easier for non-traditional companies to get into contracting?

A

Yes, exactly right. What we're trying to do here is that we're trying to tell the program manager in the acquisition community: This is what we want you to do; we want you to be flexible and innovative and responsive, and we want you to streamline the process, but I don't want to tell you how to do that. When you do it, I'm interested in interoperability, I'm interested in safety, I'm interested in properly pricing programs, I'm interested in a

whole series of things—and you'll have copies of this when it's signed—of all the things that we want you to incorporate in your processes that are important to us.

And we lay out in the instruction: Here is a series of milestones. We want you to do Milestone A, Milestone B, Milestone C, and here are some criteria to how you should enter these various milestones. And we're interested in spiral development, and we're interested, again, in proper pricing, we're interested in reducing risk, we're interested in the technology plan.

So it's prescribing what we want you to do, but not the recipe of how to do it. And that's what was happening in the old series—the 250 pages. We were giving them gory details about how to do something, and nobody was reading it. I read something the other day, an article that said, "Well, the new series really doesn't do anything different." And I said, "Well, how do you know? Nobody's ever read it." You have to compare the two to understand the difference.

Q

In the proposed numbers for the fiscal year '04 and '05 budgets, I notice there is a decrease for DISA procurement by several hundred million dollars, and there is an increase by '05 for something like 600 (million) or $700 million in procurement funds for the OSD. What correlation is there between this shift in numbers? It's almost an equal number.

A

I don't know whether DISA [Defense Information Systems Agency] had bought something in '03, [decided] they weren't buying it in '04, and therefore the numbers went down. Is it for procurement? I just don't know.

Q

It's specific to procurement. And just to follow up on that, an analyst from the Center for Strategic and International Studies surmised that possibly this is related to efforts over the years to centralize buying power in DoD.

A

No. In fact, it's just the opposite. My proposal is to decentralize buying out of the OSD. Our job in OSD is to provide policy and guidance and not to manage programs. And what was happening was, everything that was a joint [program] and they didn't' want to give it to the Service, they were giving it to my office, and I was having to manage almost $2 billion worth of effort a year. We are the wrong people to manage things like that. It needs to get back to people who have the management skills.

Q

As it's currently worded, the Wyden Amendment, if that were adopted, how would that impact the development of TIA?

A

Again, I'm trying to avoid getting into this big debate.

Wynne: We've seen so many versions of it. But what it would do is simply require more reporting to Congress over the activities that are in place now. And I think while we want to share as much as we can with the Congress, especially on this sensitive issue, we really don't think it merits that kind of day-to-day oversight. So what we are trying to do is work with the Congress, in fact, to point out to them that with this kind of resolution, with the inside board and the outside board, we are instituting the kind of oversight that in fact they wanted us to.

Q

You talk about the Navy family of ships. The Navy is trying to push the littoral combat ship, and get it fast as they can. And Ronald O'Rourke and some of the outside analysts have said the Navy has not done the analysis to determine whether this is the proper ship to be doing the kind of missions it's being sent to do. You seem to have signed off on this as a program, and you're normally a little more calculating about requiring analysis on how these things proceed.

A

No. Let me clarify. I don't know what the littoral combat ship looks like either, and neither does the Navy. But the concept of a smaller combat ship that you can afford more of, and one better designed to handle the littoral areas—that is a direction which we've all signed up to in the *Defense Planning Guidance* and the *Quadrennial Defense Review* as something that's necessary. We don't want this ship to be so big that we can't buy very many of them. We want them to have a lot of capability. And what it looks like is yet to be determined. That process is ongoing in the Navy, and when we get to the point where we have to enter into Milestone A and Milestone B, we will have all those answers. Otherwise, we can't go into those milestones.

Q

Yes, but if they want to buy the first ship in '05, from a standing start of just months ago, and have the first ones in the fleet in '07—I know you guys are trying to speed things up, but can you do it that fast?

A

I will be a skeptic, again, on this one. It has to be proven to me that we can do it that fast.

Q

The F-22 question: you said very cryptically that if the test program appears to be recovering —[Dov] Zakheim [the DoD Comptroller] alluded to this the other day—what are some of the benchmarks of recovery?

A

What was happening was we didn't have spare parts, and we didn't have airplanes. The test points—we have a drawdown, a number of test points—and you can [drawdown] to where you get to the point where you enter into OT&E (Operational Test and Evaluation). We weren't going down that slope as fast as we would like.They've reenergized it, and now we're coming down that slope faster than we were before. It looks like we can meet the schedule, provided those test points can be flown as rapidly as they say. And it looks like they can.

The other part of it was the avionics package, and that was a question of two things. One is reliability. When you turn

it on, what's the probability it's going to work? And then once they turn it on and it's working, how long does it stay working? Those two are called reliability and basically sustainability or stability. We were having some problems there—the reliability coming on was down, and it didn't run very long before they had to reboot it. And that was causing us some problems in the software package.

Reliability and the stability numbers now seem to be on the rise, which gives us some confidence that the thing will work.

Q

How many more months do you want to see the trend rise before you declare a success?

A

Well, I think the key to that is to have a certain number of points done, and the avionics package stability at a point where we can start operational test and evaluation. That is in the summer period—I'm going to say July/August period. They have to have so many down to where they can enter into it with a production representative airplane to start OT&E.

Q

A question about the Marine Corps in the upcoming '04 budget cycle. There's a big study underway now about expeditionary warfare and forcible entry. The Navy looks like it's made some decisions to delete some research and development funding out of the AAAV [Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle] program. And you yourself have considerable questions left from the V-22 [Osprey] episode. Does all of this add up to essentially a major review getting underway now of the whole Marine Corps modernization process and where they're headed?

A

Yes, the study is a review of forcible entry, and that is a question of what do you mean by forcible entry? Does that mean going across the beach? Going over the beach? What does it mean about the equipment carried [by] the Marine Corps and the Navy to the beach? All of that is under review, and it could, in fact, have an impact upon modernization and the direction we take for the future, very definitely. That's why we have it underway.



F-22 Raptor
Photo courtesy The Boeing Company

Q

I wanted to ask you a question about Joint Strike Fighter costs. One of the benefits of having international partners in the program is that U.S. buys are reduced; foreign buys could offset the price difference that usually comes along with that. The international partners in the program so far have expressed interest in the Air Force STOVL version of the plane, not the Navy's carrier version—the version that's being cut by the Navy at this point. What's the cost effect of that going to be? And does that affect just the Navy or all the Services?

A

First of all, I have no idea how many airplanes we're going to buy in Joint Strike Fighter in the year 2020, which is when all of this occurs. But the unit cost numbers, in spite of the reduction, are holding the goal we set for ourselves; roughly for the conventional airplane, $37 million a copy in FY '02 dollars.

The carrier version is a little more expensive because it has to carry more weight and some leading-edge flaps and things like a bigger wing to make sure it can operate with the right attitude. And that number's around $47 million. And the STOVL version, strangely enough, is actually less—it's only $46 million in current estimates.

Those [numbers] are holding. And it is very important that we keep that affordability number. And if we can get any additional international sales in our purchase beyond the roughly 2,600 that we plan for the U.S. and U.K., then those costs will come down even further.

Q

I'm not trying to draw you into a debate, but I'd like to ask the question, can you tell us how much money has been spent, of whatever funds may be available, on this [Total Information Awareness] research and its components so far today?

A

I can tell you what's in the budget. I can't tell you precisely how much today we've spent. We had $10 million for this project in FY '03. The project for the president's budget is $20 million in FY '04.

Q

And the contracts have not been let, or have they been let?

A

There are some contracts that have been let for people to work on this. I don't know which ones they are.

Thank you all for coming today.